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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, an estimated eleven percent of children are
born having been exposed to dangerous drugs.' Children who have
been prenatally exposed to drugs demonstrate tremulousness, irritability, and rapid mood swings for the first several months of life.
Moreover, long-term effects, including mental retardation and learning disabilities, can also occur. These children are clearly victims.
Yet the mothers, most of whom were drug addicts before becoming
pregnant, are victims as well. An addict, by definition, exhibits an

1. In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 898, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873 (1989) (citing CAL.
SEN. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DRuG-ExPOSED INFANTS -

SUMMARY OF RELATED LEGISLATION 1 (1989).
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uncontrollable craving. Thus, drugs literally control an addict's life,
often to the detriment of her unborn child.
This note will examine the modern trend of equating fetal maltreatment, via maternal substance abuse, to child neglect or abuse.
First, this note will discuss the implication of this trend in child
custody determinations. Then, criminal liability for neglect or abuse,
along with the constitutional implications of maternal liability, will
be explored. Women have the constitutional rights of privacy and
personal autonomy. 2 On the other hand, the state has a compelling
interest in protecting potential life, as well as the "quality" of that
life.3 In maternal drug abuse cases, a woman's fundamental right
of privacy and personal autonomy becomes juxtaposed against the
state's compelling interest in protecting potential life. 4 Courts across
the nation are beginning to face these troublesome questions on an
increasing basis as maternal substance abuse continues to rise.
II. DRuG UsE DuRmG PREGNANCY AS CHiLD NEGLECT
The most common penalty imposed on mothers who use drugs
during pregnancy is the removal of the newborn from the mother's
custody.5 When a newborn tests positive for a dangerous drug, many
child-protection agencies automatically institute dependency proceedings against the mother. 6
A.

Establishing Jurisdiction
A dependency proceeding to determine child custody is typically
bifurcated. 7 The court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the proceeding. 8 In order to determine jurisdiction, the
court examines whether the minor in question fits within its particular statutory description of a neglected or abused child. 9 Most

2. See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
.4. See infra notes 66-92 and accompanying text.
5. Roberts, Drug Addicted Women Who Have Babies, TRn=, Apr. 1990, at 56.
6. Id.
7. In re Stephen W., 221 Cal. App. 3d 629, 645, 271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 328 (1990).
8. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
9. Id.
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statutory descriptions of neglected or abused children specify that
a neglected or abused child is one in "imminent danger of harm"
or who has sustained "actual physical impairment" or "substantial
risk" thereof.10

1.

Imminent Danger of Harm to Newborn

In the Matter of Baby X1 represented the first case to address
the issue of dependency jurisdiction based solely upon the birth of
an infant under the influence of dangerous drugs. In Baby X, a
mother gave birth to a child exhibiting drug withdrawal symptoms. 12
The mother contended that under the applicable probate code, prenatal conduct cannot constitute neglect or abuse.1 3 However, the
court reasoned that since prior treatment of one child is probative
of how a parent will treat other soon-to-be-born siblings, prenatal
14
treatment appears probative of a child's future neglect as well.
Thus, holding that a newborn suffering narcotic withdrawal symptoms constituted a neglected child within the court's jurisdiction, the
court based its finding upon "imminent danger of harm."' 5
A New York case, In the Matter of Male R,' 6 also involved an
infant suffering from mild withdrawal. The applicable neglect statute
provided, in relevant part, that a neglected child is one whose "physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired.' 7 Hospital records established

10. See infra notes 12, 16, 25, 28 and 31 and accompanying text.
11. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 114, 293 N.W.2d at 738. The probate code McH. Cop. LAws § 712A.2 (1979), in
pertinent part, provides: "SEC. 2. It]he juvenile division of the probate court shall have: (b) jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age... (1) whose parent ... neglects
or refuses to provide proper or necessary support."
14. Stephen W. at 116, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
15. Id.
16. 102 Misc. 2d 1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819.
17. Id. at 5, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 822. Section 1012(0 of the Family Court Act, in relevant part,
provides: 'Neglected Child' means a child less than eighteen years of age (i) whose physical, mental
or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired." N.Y.
Jun. LAw § 1012(f) (McKinney 1983).
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that the mother had excessively used drugs throughout her pregnancy
and was most likely an addict.18 Moreover, withdrawal symptoms
constituted evidence of drug use, at least during the latter part of
pregnancy, as well as evidence creating a reasonable inference of
continued use after birth. 19 As was the case in Baby X, the court
predicated a neglect finding sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
20
the basis of imminent danger of impairment.
More importantly, the court refused to speculate whether withdrawal symptoms constituted "actual physical impairment. ' 21 In doing so, the court asserted:
Even if . . .it were assumed that injury to the fetus or child in utero, the effects
of which come to light after the child is born, could, in some cases, be the basis
for a finding of maternal neglect, additional troublesome questions remain. First,
since it is clear that a child in utero may be endangered or actually harmed by
a broad range of conduct on the part of a pregnant woman, it would appear
necessary to limit any application of the neglect statute to pre- natal maternal
conduct to a narrow and clearly defined class of cases.22

The court in Male R appears to acknowledge the danger of unqualifiedly equating all prenatal harm to actual physical impairment.
For example, even a maternal act as seemingly harmless as not eating
"well" could prove detrimental to a developing fetus. If fetal injury,
which becomes apparent after birth, can be the basis of a neglect
finding, and if application of the neglect statute is not limited to
a narrow class of maternal conduct, outrageous results such as custody deprivation based upon a mother's poor eating habits or use
of cigarettes or alcohol could result. 23 However unlikely and extreme
the above example appears, if all prenatal harm constitutes "actual
physical impairment," an overzealous child protection service could
theoretically attempt to establish neglect using a similar theory.

18. Male R, 102 Misc. 2d at 3-5, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
19. Id. at 6, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 823, n.12.
20. Id. at 10, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
21. Id. at 9, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
22. Id. at 10, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 825, n.18.
23. These activities are among the ones cited as harmful to fetal development by those advocating the expansion of governmental regulation of pregnant women's behavior. Johnsen, From
Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
4
L. REv. 179 (1989).
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Many state legislatures have not specified the types of prenatal
harm that are considered actual physical impairment to the newborn. 24 Nevertheless, many state courts currently treat fetal harm
caused by maternal substance abuse as actual physical impairment
to the child.25
2. Actual Physical Impairment or Substantial Risk of
Impairment to Fetus
A recent New York case, In the Matter of Stefanel Tyesha C.,26
held that a positive toxicology for cocaine in a newborn constitutes
"actual impairment" for the purpose of withstanding a motion to
dismiss. 27 Furthermore, the court stated that even a "single [detri28
mental] act" committed during pregnancy could constitute neglect.
Thus, Stefanel suggested that a court could predicate a finding of
neglect on prenatal maternal conduct alone, even a single detrimental
act.
Likewise, in the recent California case of In re Troy D.,29 the
birth of a child under the influence of a dangerous drug conferred
jurisdiction. 0 According to the court, a positive drug toxicology at
birth constitutes a "detrimental condition" attributable to the mother's "unreasonable" or neglectful acts. 1 Again, the court based a
finding of neglect, sufficient to confer jurisdiction, solely upon prenatal maternal behavior.
Similarly, an Ohio court in In re Ruiz3 2 held that a viable fetus
represents a "child" under the existing child abuse statute and harm

24. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
26. 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1990).
27. The applicable Family Court Act defines a neglected child as one whose "physical, mental
or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired .... .
N.Y. Jub. LAw § 1012(f)(i)(B).
28. Stefanel, 157 A.D.2d at 327, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
29. Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
30. Section 355.1(a) of the California Code, in pertinent part: "Where the court finds ... that
an injury, injuries or detrimental condition sustained by a minor of such a nature as would ordinarily
not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts ... that evidence shall
be prima facie evidence" that a child is neglected. CAL. WEn. & INST. CODE § 355.1 (Deering 1988).
31. Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Ohio
Misc. 2dRepository
31 (1986). @ WVU, 1991
Disseminated32.by27The
Research
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to it may be considered abuse. 33 In using heroin so close to the birth
of the child, the mother clearly created the requisite "substantial
risk" to the health of the child. 34 Thus, this court merely required
"substantial risk" of fetal impairment, rather than actual harm. The
court in Ruiz applied an even less demanding standard of neglect
than "actual physical impairment."
Various state courts agree that a child born with drug withdrawal
symptoms, or a positive toxicology, constitutes a neglected child.
However, the applicable state statutes used to reach this conclusion
vary. The future significance of these cases depends upon the language and application of the particular state statute. If courts predicate neglect findings only upon "imminent danger of harm" to the
child, they will most likely limit neglect findings to cases where the
continuation of harmful prenatal maternal conduct, which the court
infers is likely, will prove detrimental to the newborn. Drug abuse,
of course, falls squarely within this category.
On the other hand, if "actual" or "substantial risk" of impairment to the fetus represents the basis of a neglect finding, then
any prenatal maternal conduct which harms or could harm the fetus
might sufficiently establish neglect. Thus, theoretically, a mother's
poor eating habits or use of cigarettes or alcohol could constitute
the basis for a neglect finding. Since these activities say nothing
about fitness as a mother, a neglect finding appears unwarranted.
Unfortunately, most neglect statutes fail to mention fetuses."
Courts, however, often apply these statutes to unborn children. Since
most neglect statutes provide little guidance concerning fetuses, courts
33. Oaio RLv. CODE ANN. prohibits any parent from creating "a substantial risk to the health
or safety of the child by violating a duty of care, protection, or support." Osno Rv. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987).

34. Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d at 35.
35. A few state statutes treat newborns with a dependency for a controlled substance as neglected
children. FLA. STAT. Am. § 415.503 (West 1991) (provides that a neglected child includes a newborn
dependent upon a controlled substance); fLu. ANN. STAT. ch. 23 para. 2053 (Smith-Hurd 1990) (provides that a neglected child includes a newborn infant whose blood or urine contains any amount of
a controlled substance); MmN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West 1991) (provides that neglect includes
prenatal exposure to a controlled substance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846A (West 1991) (requires
all health care professionals to file a report with the Department of Human Services, when a newborn
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
6
displays symptoms of drug dependency).
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may possibly apply these statutes in a manner not contemplated by
the legislature. In order to avoid these undesirable results, legislatures must restructure neglect statutes to apply to a "narrow and
clearly defined" 3 6 class of prenatal maternal behavior such as drug
use. In the meantime, courts will likely continue to apply child neglect statutes to the unborn. Consequently, if a newborn tests positive for a drug at birth, many state courts will exercise jurisdiction
under either the "imminent danger of harm" to the newborn standard or the "actual physical impairment" or "substantial risk" of
harm to the fetus theory.
B. Disposition of the Child
Once a court determines that it has jurisdiction over the neglect
proceedings, it must decide on the appropriate disposition of the
child. In at least one case, Matter of Baby X, a probate court took
temporary custody of a newborn suffering narcotic withdrawal
38
symptoms. 3 7 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
However, the appellate court did not decide whether such prenatal
conduct alone would suffice to permanently deprive a mother of
custody. 39 Accordingly, the court would not permanently deprive the
parents of custody until the dispositional phase of the proceeding,
where prenatal conduct could be considered along with postnatal
conduct.40

In a recent California case, In re Stephen W. ,'4 the court indicated that drug use during pregnancy, coupled with continued use
after birth, could possibly suffice to permanently deprive parents of
custody. In Stephen W., an infant born with opiates in his system
displayed drug withdrawal symptoms. 42 The mother was a heroin
addict who admitted to having a long standing substance abuse prob-

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Male R, 102 Misc. 2d at 10, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 825 n.18.
Baby X, 97 Mich. App. at 113, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id.
221 Cal. App. 3d 629, 271 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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lem.4 3 The father frequently abused drugs as well." At the juris4
dictional hearing the court took temporary custody of the infant. 1
Following the jurisdictional hearing, the trial court ordered that both
parents submit to drug testing to prove they could remain drug free
until the dispositional hearing. 46 If the parents could remain drug
free for two weeks, the court indicated that custody could possibly
be returned.4 Thus, the court gave the parents adequate opportunity
to avoid custody deprivation.
Because neither parent provided drug-free tests, the court placed
the child with his paternal grandparents following the dispositional
hearing.48 Custody rights could be returned to the parents only if
they successfully completed a "family reunification" program.4 9 The
court did not specify of what the program would consist. However,
enrollment in a detoxification program would undoubtedly be required. Likewise, periodic drug tests to determine the parents' progress would likely be required.
Permanent separation of parents and child would be a last resort.
However, even though permanent custody was not specifically taken
and would be a last resort, permanent loss of custody appears realistically possible given the parents' severe drug addition. Consequently, at least one court has exhibited a willingness to permanently
deprive parents of custody when drug use during pregnancy combines with continued use subsequent to birth.
While threat of custody deprivation represents the most common
"punishment" for pregnant drug users, courts have increasingly implemented a more stringent method of punishment during the past
few years. In an effort to win the "drug war," prosecutors have
fervently prosecuted persons involved with drugs. Pregnant drug users
have not escaped the wrath of these prosecutions. Therefore, the
remainder of this note will examine the relatively modern trend of
43. Id. at 634, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 635, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
46. Id. at 636, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 637, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
49. Id. at 637, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
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criminally prosecuting women who use drugs during pregnancy.
III.

CRIMNAL LiABIrrY

Criminal prosecution and conviction of pregnant drug users became a reality on July 13, 1989, when Jennifer Johnson became the
first woman in the United States to be convicted of exposing a baby
to drugs during pregnancy. 0
Public outcry against this criminalization of prenatal maternal
conduct exists. However, public outcry does not appear widespread. 5' Possibly, many Americans simply do not realize that these
charges are being brought. Because the abortion issue, also dealing
with fetal and maternal rights, has received extensive media coverage
in the past few years, fetal abuse cases, which are relatively few in
number, have possibly gotten inadequate media attention. Public
concern, as well as outrage about drug related problems, including
children born to addicts, could also explain the lack of public response.
Moreover, some courts and commentators appear willing to adopt
any possible solution, including one which potentially infringes upon
women's constitutional rights.5 2 At least one Florida court has
adopted a novel and possibly unconstitutional solution to the "drug
53
baby" problem.
A.

State v. Johnson: The First Maternal Drug Use Conviction

Jennifer Johnson, a crack addict, gave birth to two children, a
son in 1987 and a daughter in 1989. 54 Both children tested positive

50. Roberts, supra note 5, at 56. Pamela Rae Stewart was the first woman prosecuted for
allegedly neglecting her fetus through drug use, as well as other unhealthy behavior. Id. at 58. The
court, however, dismissed the case finding that the state criminal statute did not extend to the defendant's alleged actions. The applicable statute provided that it was a crime for a parent to willfully
omit, without lawful excuse, to furnish clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance for a child. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (Deering 1985).
51. Roberts, supra note 5, at 56.
52. See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
54. Roberts, supra note 5, at 56.
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for cocaine at birth. 5 Florida prosecutor, Jeff Deen, did not set out
to prove "fetal abuse."' 56 Instead, he based his case upon the sixty
second period that a cocaine metabolite may have passed through
the infants' umbilical cords after they were delivered.5 7 In order to
support this novel theory, Deen elicited the testimony of the obstetricians who had delivered the children. 58 Both physicians testified
that, for approximately sixty seconds after delivery, blood circulates
between mother and child via the umbilical cord. 59 Furthermore, the
physicians testified that once a child is delivered, it is a person and
no longer a fetus, even though the umbilical cord is still attached. 60
Consequently, Johnson had delivered a controlled substance to a
"minor" rather than a fetus.
The trial judge accepted the prosecution's novel theory.61 The
judge reasoned that the defendant assumed the responsibility to de63
liver drug-free children. 62 A thirty year prison term was possible.
Nevertheless, the judge followed the prosecution's sentencing recommendation and gave Johnson fifteen years of probation. 64 Johnson's sentence also included an extensive drug rehabilitation
program.

65

Johnson has appealed her conviction. 6 Undoubtedly, one of her
main arguments on appeal will concern procedural due process. Procedural due process requires that the accused receive fair notice that
her conduct is criminal. Johnson will most likely contend that she
did not receive fair notice that her conduct during pregnancy was
prohibited under the applicable Florida statute, the purpose of which
67
was to punish drug pushers who give or sell drugs to minors.
55. Id.
56. Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., March, 1990, at 51.
57. Roberts, supra note 5, at 56.
58. Id. at 60.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 61.
62. Id.
63. Curriden, supra note 56, at 51.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Roberts, supra note 5, at 56 (referring to Johnson v. Florida, No. 89-1765 (Fla, Dist. Ct.
App. filed Dec. 28, 1989)).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
67. Id. at 60.
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To circumvent this possible procedural due process problem, the
Florida legislature could create a statute specifically making drug
use during pregnancy a crime.6 In other words, the Florida Legislature could give women fair notice that drug use during pregnancy
is punishable conduct. The remainder of this note will explore the
constitutional rights criminal fetal abuse statutes would possibly impair, as well as the interests they would potentially serve.
B. Statutory Prohibition of Drug Use During Pregnancy: The
ConstitutionalImplications
If a "fundamental right" is impaired by statute, the state's objective in enacting the statute must be compelling. Likewise, the
statute must be the least restrictive method of protecting the compelling state interest.
1.

The Fundamental Right of Privacy

The United States Supreme Court first delineated the right of
privacy in matters relating to marriage and procreation in Griswold
v. Connecticut.69 The statute in Griswold was a Connecticut law
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense. 70 In striking
down the statute, the Supreme Court found that several of the Bill
of Rights guarantees create "penumbral rights of privacy.1 71 The
Court held that intimate family decisions fall within this penumbra
of privacy and merit protection from government intervention 2

68. Several commentators urge legislatures to create criminal penalties for pregnant drug users.
E.g., Note, A Proposal to Illinois Legislators: Revise the Illinois Criminal Code to Include Criminal
Sanctions Against PrenatalSubstance Abusers, 23 J. MAsALL L. Ray. 393 (1990); Parness, Crimes
Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HAnv. J.oN
LEGis. 97, 171-2 (1985).

In California, more than a dozen different bills concerning prenatal maternal drug use have been
proposed. These bills "would allow a manslaughter charge for illicit drug use causing a baby born
alive to die, require that infants who test positive for drugs at birth be reported to child welfare
authorities, and include fetuses under state child abuse law." Roberts, supra note 5, at 56.
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Id.at 485.
71. Id.
72. by
Id.
Disseminated
The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
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The Supreme Court expanded Griswold in Eisenstadt v. Baird3
by stricking down a statute which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals. The Court stated that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 74
A year later, the Court decided the landmark case of Roe v.
Wade. 75 The Court based its decision, once again, upon the right
of privacy. 76 A woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy was part of the right to privacy encompassed within
"liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." In addition,
the Court held that a woman's interest in deciding whether or not
to abort the fetus is a "fundamental right," which can only be
outweighed if there is a "compelling state interest" in forbidding
abortion. 78 Moreover, the state statute must be "narrowly drawn"
so as to fulfill only that legitimate interest. 79
If the above mentioned fundamental right standards were placed
on a "spectrum," Griswold's and Eisenstadt's fundamental right to
decide whether to procreate would appear at one end. Roe's fundamental right to terminate pregnancy, 8° although already in the
process of procreating, would fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Somewhere between these two extremes the right to determine
"how" one procreates would exist. Because the Supreme Court recognizes as fundamental the right not only to decide whether to pro8
create, but also the right to terminate the procreation process, ' it

73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. Id. at 153.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id.

80. A woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is not unqualified. Once the fetus becomes
viable at the beginning of the third trimester, the state has a compelling interest in protecting potential
life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-4 (1973). Therefore, the state may prohibit all third trimester
abortions except those which preserve maternal life or health. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
12
81. See infra note 80.
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would likely recognize as fundamental the right to live as one wishes
during the procreation process.82 Therefore, decisions concerning
"how" one procreates likely merit protection unless the state has
83
compelling reason to interfere.
2. Right of Personal Autonomy and Bodily Integrity
Laws criminalizing maternal drug use not only infringe upon the
fundamental right of privacy, but they also impair the right to personal autonomy and bodily integrity. 84 "Every individual enjoys the
basic rights to 'autonomy over [his or her] own body,' freedom
'from nonconsensual invasion of ... bodily integrity' and preser-

vation of the inviolability of the person. ' 85 These rights, protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, empower a woman to resist gov86
ernmentally imposed regulation of her conduct during pregnancy.
When the right to privacy combines with the right to personal
autonomy, it becomes evident that a strong fundamental right is
involved.87 Furthermore, because state regulation of fetal abuse also
implicates the traditional rights of the parent to decide how to balance the interests of various family members,8 8 the fundamental right
to be free from governmental intrusion becomes strongest in this
context.8 9
82. "Living as one wishes"- does not include the right to violate drug laws. Pregnant women

should not be exempt from criminal drug laws. Johnsen, supranote 23, at 191. However, a law which
singles out women for "special penalties" solely because they are pregnant implicates the fundamental

rights to privacy and bodily integrity. Id. (referring to Gallagher, PrenatalInvasion and Intervention;
What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Hnv. WOMEN's L.J. 9 (1987); Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery
Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986)).

83. In July of 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided another abortion case, Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Although not overruling Roe, Webster demonstrates that several members of the Court would limit Roe's application under certain circumstances.
For a detailed discussion of Webster and its potential impact upon prenatal maternal drug use, see
Johnson, supra note 23, at 179.

84. See supra note 82.
85. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. Rv.1,
58 (1984) (quoting to Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) and quoting Super-

intendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 59.
88. Note, MaternalRights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal
Abuse, " 101 H~Av. L. Ray. 994, 1001 (1988).

89. Myers, supra note 85, at 59.
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3. Compelling State Interest
Because fetal abuse laws impair fundamental rights, courts can
sustain them only if they serve a compelling state interest and utilize
the least restrictive means available to serve the interest. In Roe v.
Wade, the state had two compelling interests: (1) protecting the health
of the mother and (2) protecting the viability of the fetus. 9° Protecting the mother's health becomes compelling after the first trimester when the dangers of abortion outweigh the dangers of child
birth. 91 The Court rejected the argument that a fetus is a person
deserving protection prior to viability under the Fourteenth Amendment. 92

a. Maternal Health
Laws criminalizing prenatal maternal drug use could arguably
protect maternal health by inducing pregnant women to forego drug
use or seek treatment for addiction. 93 However, Molly McNulty, a
reproductive law expert, criticizes the deterrence argument. 94 According to McNulty, "[d]rug use is already illegal, and if it doesn't
deter people, then what's another law aimed at pregnant women
going to do?." 951 She feels another law, aimed at pregnant women,
is useless. 96 Most likely, such a law would do nothing to deter an
addict with an uncontrollable urge for drugs. Thus, a court possibly
would not accept an asserted compelling interest involving protection
of maternal health.
b. Quality of Potential Life
Professor John Myers has argued that the state's "interest in
potential life should extend to protection of the quality of life."' '
90.
91.
92.
93.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 160.
Drug use does imperil the mother's health. For instance, cocaine use can cause hypertension,

as well as other complications, which can lead to a stroke or seizure. MacGregor, Keith, Chasnoff,
Rosner, Chisum, Shaw, Minogue, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Adverse PerinatalOutcome, 157
AM. J. OBST.

GYNECOL. 689 (1987).

94. Curriden, supra note 57, at 52.
95. Id.
96. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
97. Myers, supra note 80, at 19.
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Since a state can mandate that a woman complete her pregnancy
once the fetus becomes viable, it follows that the state has the obligation and power to protect the fetus from abuse or neglect by its
parents.98
As a society, we place a premium upon "quality of life." Children born with birth defects or mental retardation caused by irresponsible maternal conduct can never enjoy life in its fullest.
Prevention of a lifetime of suffering, due to birth defects, mental
retardation, and other problems caused by maternal drug use, may
arguably represent as compelling an interest as saving the fetus upon
viability. Consequently, the state likely has a compelling interest in
protecting quality of potential life.
3. Least Restrictive Alternative
While women have fundamental rights of privacy and bodily
integrity which are likely impaired by fetal abuse laws, 99 the state
possibly has a compelling interest in protecting the quality of potential life. 10° Thus, the determining factor as to the constitutionality
of fetal abuse laws becomes whether such laws are the least restrictive method of protecting the quality of potential life. 10 1
As stated before, the most widely accepted and implemented
"punishment" for pregnant drug users has been the threat of losing
custody of the child. Because drug problems have worsened, a more
effective solution may be needed. However, criminalization of maternal drug use may not be the least restrictive solution to the "drug
baby" problem. For example, a Roe v. Wade "trimester" approach
appears less restrictive than a law criminalizing drug use throughout
pregnancy.
According to Roe, a state does not have a compelling interest
during the first trimester of pregnancy.102 Therefore, the state may
98. In the Matter of Fathima Ashanti K.J., 147 Misc. 2d 551, 554, 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449
(1990).
99. See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
102. 410 U.S. at 164.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 13
1098

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

not regulate first trimester abortions. 0 3 During the second trimester,
the state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling. 1° ' Thus, in the second trimester, the state may regulate abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. 05
When the fetus becomes viable at the beginning of the third trimester, the state has a compelling interest in protecting potential
life.1°6 Consequently, the state may prohibit all third trimester abortions, except those which preserve maternal life or health. 10 7
In Roe, "potential life" merited protection only after reaching
the point of viability. Likewise, "quality of potential life" may arguably merit protection only after viability. Thus, if courts hold
women criminally liable for prenatal maternal drug use, they should
possibly limit liability to cases of third trimester drug use.
The trimester approach appears less restrictive than criminal prohibition of drug use throughout pregnancy. However, "Roe's trimester framework may be simply illogical in the context of fetal
abuse because it permits increasing regulation as pregnancy progresses whereas fetuses are most vulnerable in the earliest stages of
10 8
pregnancy."
Another suggested less restrictive alternative to criminal prohibition of drug use throughout pregnancy consists of mandatory enrollment for pregnant drug users in a residential drug treatment
program.' 9 Moreover, this requirement "may be the only way to
force these drug centers to open their doors to pregnant women." 10
For instance, a recent survey of seventy-eight drug-treatment programs in New York City found that eighty-seven percent excluded
crack-addicted pregnant women on Medicaid."' The handful of programs in this country for pregnant addicts have inadequate funds
103. Id.
104. Id. at 163.
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. at 162-4.
107. Id.
108. Note, supra note 88, at 998.
109. Curriden, supra note 56, at 52. A drawback to the mandatory enrollment approach might
be the difficulty in creating an effective screening system for addicts who do not seek prenatal care.
110. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/13
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111. Roberts, supra note 5, at 58.
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to treat the majority of women who seek help.112 Thus, a less restrictive, and possibly more effective means of protecting "drug babies" would be to not only require treatment at these centers, but
also to provide adequate funds to enable these centers to operate.
Furthermore, the method of preserving a compelling state interest
must actually serve the interest, as well as be the least restrictive
one possible. 13 Criminalization of maternal conduct quite possibly
will not serve the state's compelling interest. The threat of prosecution has already scared pregnant drug users away from public
hospitals and health-care programs." 4 Thus, the fetus' well-being
may be even more at risk. Another criticism of criminalization is
that once an addict discovers she is pregnant, the only way she can
definitely avoid punishment is by choosing to abort the fetus.11 5 Possibly causing pregnant women to forgo prenatal care or opt for an
abortion, laws criminalizing maternal conduct may not serve the
state interest in protecting fetal well-being." 6
Because fetal abuse laws are not likely the least restrictive alternative and possibly do not serve a compelling state interest, they
may not pass the strict scrutiny test. Thus, laws which criminalize
maternal drug use could quite possibly be unconstitutional.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although most child neglect statutes do not mention the unborn,
courts frequently apply them to fetuses. Undesirable "misuse" of
these statutes may occur if they are not limited to a narrow and
clearly defined class of prenatal maternal conduct bearing directly
upon a mother's ability to care for her newborn child. Undoubtedly,
drug abuse falls within this category while other "harmless" prenatal

112. Id.
113. Note, supra note 88, at 1008 (referring to Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2181-82 (1986)).
114. Roberts, supra note 5, at 58.
115. Curriden, supra note 56, at 52.
116. The United States Catholic Conference also opposes special punitive measures specifically
aimed at pregnant drug users. Johnsen, supra note 23, at 212. The Conference does not believe drug
laws aimed at pregnant women serve the government's purpose of protecting unborn children. Id.
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behavior would not be punishable conduct. This*is a valid and reasonable distinction between prenatal maternal conduct which if continued after birth would harm the newborn and that which would
not.
Because courts treat prenatal maternal drug use as child neglect,
courts must make custody determinations. Temporary, as well as
permanent loss of custody, has become realistically possible.
While custody deprivation appears reasonable and in the child's
best interest, laws criminalizing prenatal maternal drug use are possibly unconstitutional. Women have fundamental rights of privacy
and personal autonomy. Likewise, the state has a compelling interest
in the protection of the quality of potential life. However, criminalization of drug use during pregnancy is most likely not a least
restrictive alternative. Furthermore, even if criminalization were a
least restrictive alternative, it would probably not serve the state's
interest. Instead, women may forego prenatal care or abort the fetus
to avoid detection and punishment. Therefore, laws criminalizing
prenatal maternal drug use may well be unconstitutional.
Obviously, a solution must be found for the tragic epidemic of
children born addicted to drugs. An adequate solution can be discovered only when time, effort and money are spent to create effective treatment facilities for pregnant addicts.
Ellen L. Townsend
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